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Abstract— This paper critiques existing methods and 
experimentation that use virtual reality (VR) and associated 
technologies to define and measure ‘presence’. Relevant 
contemporary philosophical resources are used to critique and 
reframe existing research, introducing a new post-human 
perspective on presence. Here, a new methodology is built as a 
foundation for research methods used for capturing subjective, 
experiential data and to contribute to current thinking around 
experiential design for VR. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The International Society of Presence Research defines 
presence as ‘a psychological state or subjective perception in 
which even though part or all of an individual’s current 
experience is generated by and/or filtered through human-
made technology, part or all of the individual’s perception 
fails to accurately acknowledge the role of the technology in 
the experience’ [13]. Other notable researchers define 
presence as ‘a normal awareness phenomenon that requires 
directed attention and is based in the interaction between 
sensory stimulation, environmental factors that encourage 
involvement and enable immersion, and internal tendencies to 
become involved’ [25] and ‘as the propensity of people to 
respond to virtually generated sensory data as if they were 
real’ [20]. Research designed to capture data relevant to these 
definitions use a variety of methods, including questionnaires 
[25], the measurement of physiological responses [16] and 
neuro-analysis [3, 4]. 
When critiquing this approach, a range of philosophical 
perspectives relating to presence will be drawn from, 
including Merleau-Ponty’s ‘phenomenal field’ [17], Dewey’s 
‘Experience and Nature’ [9], Deleuze’s ‘Difference and 
Repetition’ [5] and Harman's ‘tool-being' [12]. Here, a post-
human position on presence is established; one that critiques 
self-sovereignty and embraces intra-actional [2] 
understandings of co-equal relationships between subject, 
material and virtual objects. The continued significance of 
selfhood via embodied experience, and how VR can contribute 
to this understanding, is explored. The paper addresses 
philosophical perspectives on the 'real' and the 'virtual' and 
whether it is possible to substitute one for the other, or could 
VR rather be used as a tool to reframe habitual understandings 
of both. 
The methodology and active/reflective research process 
outlined draws from Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘speculative 
experimentation’, whereby ‘experimentation is always that 
which is in the process of coming about – the new, remarkable 
and interesting that replace the appearance of truth’ [6]. Where 
Deleuze asserts that difference is primary, presence can be 
perceived as a continual (re)creation that consistently evades 
capture and measurement. 
Finally, the paper considers how immersive digital 
technologies can be used to build VR models further exploring 
new understandings of presence, and suggestions for how the 
potential boundaries of presence and selfhood within virtual 
environments can be explored through practical 
experimentation. Habitual, representative notions of self, 
environment and the relationships between them are 
bracketed, with VR design instead approaching what Deleuze 
calls the 'extra-propositional or sub-representative problematic 
instance'; an image of thought 'which traverses the fragments 
of a dissolved self as it does the borders of a fractured I' [5]. 
The mind-body-world separation in existing research is 
addressed, drawing from Dewey’s interpretation of ‘body-
mind’, where ‘the anomaly apparent in the occurrence of 
consciousness is evidence of the anomalous phase of nature 
itself’ [9]. New insights are proposed outlining how immersive 
digital technologies can be used as practice-based tools to 
explore current questions around presence, experience and 
selfhood within contemporary theoretical and philosophical 
disciplines in innovative ways, and inform further innovations 
in experiential design. 
II. CURRENT PRESENCE EXPERIMENTATION 
The following section examines existing research taking 
various approaches to the measurement of presence using VR 
technologies. Research methods and the interpretation of 
results are critiqued, highlighting some of the inherent 
complexities that appear within these approaches to presence. 
A. Presence in Real and Virtual Worlds 
In a critique of the use of questionnaires as a data collection 
method in presence research, Usoh, Catena, Arman and Slater 
indicate that ‘if presence is optimal for real-world experiences 
then methods that attempt to elicit or measure presence should 
be able to discriminate between experiences that take place in 
a physical environment and virtual environment’ [24] (see also 
[19]). The researchers undertook an experiment whereby 
participants completed an object finding exercise in a real and 
virtually simulated version of the same environment. 
Participants answered two presence questionnaires (the 
Witmer and Singer Presence Questionnaire (WS) [25], and 
another developed by Slater and colleagues (SUS)), 
attempting to ascertain whether the presence measure could 
pass a ‘reality test’. This was determined ‘if the measured 
presence is greater for the real environment, under today’s 
conditions, and for the foreseeable future’ [24]. Results 
indicated that, as the SUS questionnaire only scored 
marginally higher for the real environment versus the virtual, 
and there was no significant difference across environments 
for the WS questionnaire, ‘that though such questionnaires 
may be useful when all subjects experience the same type of 
environment, their utility is doubtful for the comparison of 
experiences across environments’ [24]. 
The conclusions drawn from this experiment highlight some 
of the complications that arise when a single definition and 
measurement for presence is used across different participant 
experiences. However, there are a number of additional factors 
with the experiment design, data collection method and 
interpretation of results not specifically targeted by the 
experiment that contribute to this complexity. 
Firstly, although the VR environment used in the experiment 
was designed to resemble the real environment, there are 
marked differences between the two experiences that will 
fundamentally alter the virtual experience for the participant; 
including but not limited to colour, quality of textured 
surfaces, lighting, sound, tactile quality and the lack of many 
other auxiliary sensations and experiential factors that cannot 
be simulated by the VR hardware used. 
Secondly, the questionnaires do not offer the participant the 
opportunity to reflect on their interpretation of the targeted 
factors in sufficient detail, nor do they consider factors with 
sufficient rigour. The SUS questionnaire is designed to target 
three main themes; ‘the sense of being in the VE, the extent to 
which the VE becomes the dominant reality, and the extent to 
which the VE is remembered as a ‘place’’ [24]. The 
questionnaire required participants to indicate on a seven-point 
scale to what extent their experience ‘seemed like the reality’ 
for them, and later to compare the structure of their memory of 
the experience ‘to the structure of the memory of other places 
you have been’ [24]. The questionnaire presupposes that each 
participant has an identical understanding of what is 
considered to be an adequate measure of reality and structure 
of their memories, applied with an equal capacity for deciding 
this measure on the scale. The concepts around perception of 
reality and the structure of memory are very deeply complex. 
Elements of these could be considered from many different 
scientific and philosophical interpretations before they are 
defined and applied to an experimental setting. 
From the above examination, it is argued that the two 
experiences featured within the experiment cannot be 
compared to measure presence in this way. As well as 
highlighting that comparing results from the same presence 
measures across different experiences is problematic, the 
experiment further highlights that it is unlikely that presence 
can be universally measured across single or multiple 
experimental settings at all. VR technologies are not 
sufficiently technologically advanced to comprehensively 
simulate the full range of interconnecting events and 
experiences that form the full spectrum of presence in reality. 
Even if it were technologically possible to produce a 
comprehensive multi-sensory experience that completely 
isolated the participant from their experience of reality, 
attempting to implement a universal presence measure across 
this and ‘real’ experience would still raise issues. That is not 
to say that it is impossible to experience presence in its 
fullness whilst engaging with VR. Presence is not a feeling 
that can be quantified on a scale, diminished by the 
impoverished sensory quality of VR. Both the experience of 
reality and whilst engaged with VR are events in which the 
complete presence process occurs. Presence can be argued to 
be a continuously engaged process that consists of the totality 
of all aspects of the event in co-dependent relationships. The 
event of experiencing the real and the virtual worlds both elicit 
presence, but these are different presences. 
Furthermore, the experiment does not adequately address the 
differences and complexities between events and experiences 
that can occur between different participants, at different times 
and in different environments. It cannot be presumed that 
there is a universal human capacity for perception, judgement 
of reality and memory structure independent of the event that 
can be used as a benchmark for measuring presence across 
different experimental settings. As will be outlined in more 
detail below, a particular presence, as reflected upon, can be 
seen as a complex emergent phenomenon with dependencies 
and relevant factors that fluctuate according to the changing 
interactions that take place within the process. The individual 
participant that senses and experiences, along with all the 
dispositions, interests, fluctuating attentions, thoughts and 
diversions, are not outside of but rather constitute their 
experience to reflect upon. It is this in its fullness that 
constitutes the presence that the SUS experiment questionnaire 
attempts to target. This experience is very complex and 
completely unique to the individual participant and the real 
and/or virtual objects they are engaged with. An identical VR 
experience engaged with by the same participant at a different 
time would produce another new presence as their thoughts 
and attentions fluctuate once more. It is necessary to 
acknowledge these considerations in order to avoid issues that 
accompany the presupposition of a universal model of 
understanding and potential measure of presence. 
B. Physiological Measures of Presence 
An alternative approach to presence measurement targets 
physiological responses to stressful virtual environments. An 
experiment undertaken by Meehan, Insko, Whitton and 
Brooks exposed participants to a virtual environment featuring 
a deep pit which users are invited to stand at the edge of. 
During the experiment, a measure of physiological responses; 
skin temperature, heart rate and skin conductance, were taken. 
In a variation of the experiment, a ‘passive haptic’ element 
was introduced in the form of a 1.5 inch high wooden 
platform, positioned to coincide with the location of the virtual 
pit. As a measure of validity, the University College London 
presence questionnaire (UCL) [22, 23] was implemented. The 
experiment hypothesised that ‘to the degree that a VE seems 
real, it would evoke physiological responses similar to those 
evoked by the corresponding real environment, and that 
greater presence would evoke a greater response’ [16]. 
The results found that a change in heart rate satisfied the 
requirements for the hypothesised measure of presence. The 
addition of the passive active element increased the reported 
measure of presence even further. This experiment differs 
from the previous one highlighted in that it focusses on 
involuntary responses rather than on conscious reflections of 
presence. It also incorporates the active presence of additional 
physical objects within the experiment. Aside from featuring 
similar presuppositions regarding universal participant 
capacity for response, the experiment highlights further 
complexities around what the presence of additional objects 
within the process are or could be in relation to the participant, 
and how they in turn affect the participant. 
For a participant, fully engaged with the VR experiment and 
experiencing a sufficient level of anxiety as indicated by their 
measured physiological response, the 1.5 inch wooden 
platform is no longer what it could be perceived to be in the 
‘real’ world. Results showed that this element ‘significantly 
increased’ reported presence and is therefore argued to be a 
significant factor in the intensity of the event overall. Here 
again, it is the individual participants perception and 
disposition that is targeted as a measure of presence. 
Within this experience, the presence of self and that of 
relevant objects within the environment generate identities in 
intra-actional relationships. The reality of the passive haptic 
element is no longer a small wooden board for the participant, 
but rather is the edge of the pit itself, potentially signifying 
significant risk or danger of injury or death. In other cases, it 
may signify a moment of exhilaration, or may insight 
complete indifference. These often compound, overlapping 
sensations, developed co-dependently by the objects and the 
participant, become factors of the presence process in their 
own right. The object is no longer as it could be objectively 
known, but could rather be seen as a locus for complex intra-
action of sensations and subjectivities. As with identity, these 
factors also undergo continuous variation. The same can be 
said for purely virtual objects featured in the experience that 
are not supplemented by tactile stimulus. What results is not 
simply a virtually simulated object that stands as a substitute 
to resemble an object in reality, but a completely new, 
separate and real object with equal significance and relevance 
to the presence process as that of one encountered in reality.  
This highlights the malleability of meanings, identities, 
significances and relevancies of objects within the presence 
event. The experiment also demonstrates that an objects 
identity does not pre-exist the intra-action that develops it. The 
identity, significance and potential instrumentality of objects 
are not fixed in real or virtual worlds. Whilst an object 
experienced will be a certain way for one participant, for 
another it will be different. Repeat engagement with objects 
will further alter their presence as new events and 
significances emerge. Non-humans engaged with their reality 
will generate entirely different configurations of presence. The 
presence of self and an understanding of physical and mental 
states is generated by their relation to the environment itself. 
Simultaneously, the identity and significance of the 
environment is developed in a wholly unique way in relation 
to the individual self. This complexity makes universal 
measures of presence even more problematic. However, by 
overlaying parts of experience with virtually simulated 
stimulus in VR, it may be possible to deliberately manipulate 
the identity and meaning of objects, self and their 
significances. The ability to use VR to manipulate presence in 
this way presents an opportunity to gain greater insight into 
how meaning and presences are developed. 
C. Body Ownership and Neuro-analysis 
Presence research has featured the use of neuro-analytic 
processes based on the concept of the ‘minimal phenomenal 
self’, with constituting factors defined by Blanke and 
Metzinger as ‘a globalized form of identification with the 
body as a whole…spatiotemporal self-location and… a first 
person perspective’ [4]. Experimentation features a simulation 
of the phenomena of out of body experiences and autoscopy 
using VR in order to manipulate feelings of body ownership 
and first person perspective. This has also been combined with 
simultaneous real world tactile, measurement of physiological 
response and the use of questionnaires [3, 21]. 
Research undertaken has found that a transfer of body-
ownership from the self to a virtual avatar is possible. Results 
from the Slater, Spanlang, Sanchez-Vives and Blanke 
experiment indicated that simultaneous tactile stimulation and 
a first person perspective were important factors in generating 
a body transfer illusion in the place of the participants own 
body. The researchers speculate that ‘sensorimotor 
contingencies endow ‘place-ness’ to virtual space and the 
objects within it… When the virtual body is perceived to be in 
the same place as where the real body should be, perhaps this 
provides overwhelming evidence for the brain to generate the 
illusion that the virtual body is one’s own’ [21]. Other 
experimentation has utilised the same factors to generate a 
reported sense of body ownership away from the location of 
the first person perspective [10, 15]. 
This research highlights some important factors that can 
contribute to a developing sense of body ownership and the 
centring of what is regarded as self within human experience. 
However, these factors, taken in isolation, do not adequately 
contribute to a discussion of presence in its fullness. Whilst 
research may be able to identify factors relevant to the 
perceived locus of experiences for human subjects, this says 
little about how the body is understood in its instrumentality 
and its relationship to experience within the environment. In 
order to understand the body, it must be experienced within 
the context of its potential interaction with the environment as 
a whole. A sense of agency is important here, and as other 
research has shown, it is also possible to use VR technologies 
to extend agency and body ownership to avatars that do not 
conform to the body as it is habitually understood, causing 
participants to perceive the self differently [1, 14, 18]. This 
reinforces the comments previously made on the indeterminate 
and fluctuating nature of the self and environment within 
presence, and the ability to use VR technologies to manipulate 
this in the process of its development. As has been shown, 
neither the self nor the environment are independent of the 
event of presence, both are equally dependent on each other in 
generating their identity and their potentialities for being and 
interaction within the event. As time passes and interactions 
take place these identities can change, as co-dependent 
relationships between objects within perception are enriched 
and others diminished according to the situation. 
Ultimately, the only tool a human participant has at their 
disposal to experience presence is perception. Through 
experimentation using VR, some of the fundamental factors 
deemed relevant to presence, when perceived, have proved to 
be far from fixed and measureable. This view of presence 
makes traditional research methods challenging to implement, 
indicating that a new methodology would be beneficial. 
III. PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PRESENCE 
Current presence research highlights a number of factors that 
may be relevant to a particular definition of presence within a 
specific context. However, presence itself cannot be 
comprehensively understood from a purely human-centric 
perspective; an understanding of presence taken holistically 
requires that the presuppositions that follow the adoption of a 
universal model of a perceiving human self is abandoned in 
favour of a non-hierarchical, intra-actional model of all 
aspects of reality. The following section considers the works 
of various philosophers who have written on the subject of the 
body, self, the environment, time, learning and the 
relationships between these, in order to articulate a post-
human standpoint and methodology on presence research. 
A. Graham Harman – Object Oriented Ontology 
Contemporary presence research has shown that an 
individualistic and human-centred standpoint on presence 
disregards much of the complexity of the presence process. 
This could stifle the opportunity for a richer understanding of 
presence; revealing insight into the intra-dependence and 
vibrancy of collective realities, and the potential for a deeper 
level of empathy for various forms of being. 
Working towards a post-human model of reality, Graham 
Harman uses Heidegger’s section in ‘Being and Time’ on the 
analysis of tools to describe the emergence of being between 
all objects as a non-hierarchical system of exchange. Within 
Harman’s ‘Tool-Being’ [12], all objects are regarded as forms 
of equipment that bring forth the individuality and variable 
reality of themselves and all other objects. Objects do not exist 
as absolutes in reality, nor do they pre-exist the relations that 
form them. What emerges here is a view of the world as ‘an 
infrastructure of equipment already at work, of tool-beings 
unleashing their forces upon us just as savagely and 
flirtatiously as they duel with one another’ [12]. Beyond what 
a human observer may understand as their reality, there is a 
vast and complex network of being taking place, with much of 
it ‘unknown to us, and… certainly not invented by us’ [12]. 
Harman describes this amorphous reality as ‘the totality 
known as world’ [12]. This reality does not conform 
absolutely to any specific context or world model; ‘every 
being is entirely absorbed into this world-system, assigned to 
further possibilities in such a way that there could never be 
any singular end-point within the contexture of reference’ 
[12]. Far from providing an objective, exterior view of reality, 
human perception and the presence that emerges ‘does not 
stand as a simple finality, but gains its meaning only from an 
ulterior series of possibilities upon which it is projected’ [12]. 
The actuality and individuality of objects that emerges in 
human understanding is not final. But, furthermore, it is not 
the relationships between these actualities as they have been 
understood by contemplative humans in which some of the 
primary presence-making processes occurs. Underneath this 
surface, representative view of reality, being and beings 
operate in myriad interactions and configurations. For Harman 
‘there is no such thing as a ‘horizon’, but only a system of 
exchange between beings and their being… The primary 
dualism is not between the thing and its ground, which is 
Dasein’s own personal problem… Rather, the key dualism is 
the one between the tangible contours of all such entities and 
the mute system of actuality into which they withdraw’ [12]. 
These ‘tangible contours’ operate as a ‘real affect within the 
cosmos, an autonomous reality unleashing its forces upon the 
world quite apart from Dasein’s projections’ [12]. The 
relations and events that take place are the individualities 
themselves. Each individual intra-action, not only between 
human and non-human entities but between all entities 
interacting and individualising each other everywhere at all 
times, make specific contexts, and the systems that can be 
understood, possible. Presence for a human observer is just 
one possible context amongst an infinity of others, and its 
development is only possible within this system. 
The ‘ontological drama of reality vs. presence’ [12], that 
results from the duality of being as observed from a human-
centric perspective, is at the heart of some of the issues 
highlighted above. To view non-human entities as 
‘unproblematic lumps of matter’ [12] is too narrow when 
considering presence in its totality. Some events may be 
deemed inconsequential whilst reflecting from a particular 
standpoint. Despite this ‘they still exert their reality within the 
total system of entities… Any measurement or direct vision of 
them… will always be dependent on their primary reality as 
tool-beings’ [12]. The non-hierarchical system of exchange 
that has been developed here reframes presence, outlining a 
sub-representative, pre-individual process in which the status 
of entities, self or otherwise, do not pre-exist or develop 
outside of the relations and interactions which form them. 
Entities are intra-actional events, and no specific context or 
perception can exhaust the potentialities of their being. 
B. Merleau-Ponty – Phenomenology of Perception 
The model of reality described above provides the foundation 
for developing a post-human methodology for presence. 
However, applying this approach within practical 
experimentation utilising human perception requires a more 
detailed examination into how the emergence of self could be 
possible within the philosophical framework. 
The case studies of existing presence research above showed 
that the perception, identity and significance of self and 
objects for research participants, whether in reality or whilst 
engaged in VR, are continuously variable, relational and 
malleable. The ‘phenomenal field’, as developed by Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty [17] describes how these factors, and the 
learning process that changes and enriches them, develops 
within human perception. Within the phenomenal field, a 
habitual understanding of self and environment is developed 
in a co-dependent process. Here, the potentialities for motility 
and interaction with the environment by the body are 
understood by the body’s movement and the responses and 
sensations felt within the environment. Simultaneously, 
objects and the environment receive fluctuating significances 
as they are interacted with, and become more or less relevant 
according to the particular situation. 
Intentionality is at the core of this process. At each interaction, 
the self maintains a desired intention, modifying the approach 
and path taken as is needed by the situation. These 
modifications are, in turn, factored into the event as the body 
moves through time, closer to its intention; ‘…previous 
attitudes and movements provide an ever-ready standard of 
measurement… At each successive instant of a movement, the 
preceding instant is not lost sight of. It is, as it were, 
dovetailed into the present, and present perception generally 
speaking consists in drawing together, on the basis of one’s 
present perception, the succession of previous positions, which 
envelop each other’ [17]. As well as previous attitudes, the 
‘impending position is also covered by the present, and 
through it all those which will occur throughout the 
movement’ [17]. 
Through this process, a habitual understanding of the 
potentialities of the self and the environment is developed 
through intra-action, including actions successfully completed 
as well as sometimes unexpected, desirable or undesirable 
consequences. This process can be summarised by what 
Merleau-Ponty refers to as ‘sense-experience’ [17]. Here, 
sensation is not understood outside of the context of 
experience and there is no fixed notion of self or environment. 
Nothing can be assigned a fixed identity outside of the 
fluctuating process itself. Through sense-experience, it is not 
possible to view objects and experience purely objectively. 
The self cannot view experience impartially as it is an integral 
and part of the process, depended and dependent on all factors 
in its development. Sense-experience describes the process in 
its ‘vital value, grasping it first in its meaning for us, for that 
heavy mass which is our body, whence it comes about that it 
always involves a reference to the body’ [17]. 
Sense-experience, as developed by Merleau-Ponty, articulates 
the non-hierarchical system of exchange that develops 
meaning and significance for the self and environment from a 
human perspective. Through intentionality and active 
experimentation, the self generates an understanding of 
presence and the role of the environment and the body in its 
development. As this understanding increases in 
sophistication, habits are formed and incorporated 
unconsciously into future interaction with the world; from 
basic motility, to the use of tools and more practical 
instrumentalities, and then further into more complex social 
and cultural interaction. The consolidation of the event 
understood through intention, the objects featured within it 
and associated feelings and habits formed are the entities 
described by Harman through the lens of human perception. It 
is an investigation into the process of the primary formation of 
these entities that could serve as a starting point for a post-
human research methodology for presence. 
C. John Dewey – Experience and Nature 
Moving from ‘sense-experience’, John Dewey’s ‘Experience 
and Nature’ elaborates on the development of self and 
boundaries of presence. Dewey departs from the privileging of 
human perception and the supposed ownership of experience 
as key components in the formation of self, favouring a 
position in which all events; whether mental, physical or 
natural, occur within the same intra-dependent system. 
For Dewey, the implication ‘that experience by its very nature 
is owned by someone; and that the ownership is such in kind 
that everything about experience is affected by a private and 
exclusive quality’ [9] is an absurdity. Rejecting a duality 
between natural and mental events, Dewey denies that ‘traits 
characteristic of thinking… do not possess the same existential 
character as do the objects of valid knowledge’ [9]. These 
traits, listed as ‘uncertainty, ambiguity, alternatives, inquiring, 
search, selection, experimental reshaping of external 
conditions… are evidential of the character of the world 
within which thinking occurs’ [9]. Dewy states that ‘the 
ultimate evidence of genuine hazard, contingency, irregularity 
and indeterminateness in nature’ [9] can be found mirrored in 
the processes that underlie thought. It is argued here that 
‘experience when it happens has the same dependence upon 
objective natural events’ [9] as it does other physical, social or 
mental events. It is ‘among and within these occurrences, not 
outside of them nor underlying them’ in which can be found 
‘those events which are denominated selves’ [9]. 
Dewey also suggests that ‘the feature which characterises 
symbolism… which later reflection calls a symbol is not a 
symbol, but a direct vehicle, a concrete embodiment, a vital 
incarnation’ [9]. Objects and events presented by reflection are 
described as ‘condensed substitutes of actual meanings and 
events, which they embody actual things with more direct and 
enhanced import than do the things themselves with their 
distractions, imposition and irrelevances’ [9]. Dewey later 
comments that ‘underlying ‘reality’ and surface 
‘appearance’… have a meaning fixed by the function of 
inquiry, not an intrinsic metaphysical meaning’ [9]. It is 
necessary to apply the caveat here that these symbols, brought 
forth by reflective human thought, can only be developed by 
the function of enquiry based on human understanding. Whilst 
an image of thought that occurs amongst and in co-
dependence with natural processes is a positive step towards a 
post-human standpoint on presence, this image of thought 
itself is context specific nonetheless and cannot be said to 
bring us closer to ‘actual things’ or absolutes. The term ‘vital 
incarnation’ is apt; suggesting a context specific and unique 
life of an event developed in conjunction with another vital, 
living object/event, albeit with the distractions, impositions 
and irrelevances that accompany it. 
Dewey begins to describe the process of development leading 
to this ‘vital incarnation’, and its relationship in forming and 
being formed by other events within perception for humans 
and other organisms, through the process of habit-forming. 
Here, Dewey describes how an emergent awareness and 
understanding of the body and the environment is formed 
through continued and varying interaction. Relevant memories 
and previously formed habits are factored into the execution of 
new interactions and the formation of new habits, whilst new 
events simultaneously modify previously formed habits and 
memories. Each new interaction with the environment features 
‘numerous and complex’ conditions for its execution 
involving ‘search and experimentation; the organism is 
compelled to make variations, and exposed to error and 
disappointment’ [9]. The success of this awareness and 
learning process requires the organism to have an ‘increased 
susceptibility, sensitiveness, responsiveness’ [9]. Highly 
complex situations, including that of human perception and 
interaction, will feature many overlapping conditions and 
opportunities for variation. These events are never fixed or 
wholly repeatable; they are defined by and contingent on their 
‘instability, novelty, emergence of the unexpected and 
unpredictable combinations’ [9]. For Dewey, it is this novelty 
that induces an awareness of the event; a ‘shock, and an 
accompanying perception of dissolving and reforming 
meaning’ [9]. As well as events that are perceived as 
particularly novel or interesting, the same can be said for each 
familiar, successive instant as it is perceived; ‘The familiar 
does not consciously appear, save in an unexpected, novel, 
situation, where the familiar presents itself in a new light and 
is therefore not wholly familiar’ [9]. Each new action requires 
a new perception, and with it another reforming of meaning. 
Presence, the instant of reality, as understood from a human or 
non-human perspective, or between individual humans and/or 
non-humans, is ‘a moving growing, never finished process’ 
[9]. Perception witnesses each moment of presence 
solidifying, striking the end of a particular process and 
instigating a new event, each one dependent on the 
intentionality of the organism and the past, present and 
anticipated future for its development. There is ‘no single all-
at-once beginning of everything’ [9] and neither is there a true 
end to presence. Dewey describes that ‘the self is not 
something ready-made, but something in continuous formation 
through choice of action’ [8]. However, as described by 
Harman, underneath perception, ‘choice of action’ or any 
particular model for reality, there is a groundless, amorphous 
totality that cannot be punctuated in this way. A review of 
Merleau-Ponty and Dewey has shown some of the intra-
dependencies that formulate what is offered to reflection by 
the perceptual faculties of a particular organism. However, 
this model alone could be said to homogenise experience, 
discarding much of the richness and disparity that occurs 
between individual events, regarded as selves or otherwise. A 
more detailed examination into the possibilities of a ground 
for thought itself is required. 
D. Gilles Deleuze – Difference and Repetition 
The philosophy of Gilles Deleuze challenges the 
homogenisation and supposed universality of representative 
models of thought. In ‘Difference and Repetition’ [5], Deleuze 
articulates a model of the sub-representative sense-making 
processes that underlie and generate the moment of awareness, 
or presence, as it is recognised by reflective thought. Deleuze 
argues that, behind the comprehension of self or object that is 
delivered up for reflection, there is a pre-individual and 
chaotic process that brings them into being. Deleuze describes 
this process as a forced, ‘dark precursor’ [5] which eventually 
gives rise to identity or resemblance. Here, ‘sensation and that 
which can only be sensed are one in the same thing’ [5]. Each 
element of sensation and the synthesis of these into a coherent 
form of representation is a result of a forced communication, 
‘when each disjointed faculty communicates to another the 
violence which carries it to its own limit’ [5]. 
It is a groundless ‘free form of difference which awakens the 
faculty, and awakens it as the different within that difference’ 
[5]. Difference is not understood here as dissimilarity between 
identities of objects already comprehended within 
representation. Rather, it is a timeless, pure difference that 
signifies the continual beginning of thought, what Deleuze 
describes as ‘fiery imperatives, these questions which are the 
beginning of the world’ [5]. These ‘fiery imperatives’ can be 
likened to Dewey’s description of the unexpected, novel 
‘shock’ that catalyses sense-making processes. For Deleuze, 
the process of becoming that culminates in the moment of 
presence finds its initiation in the form of a continual problem, 
or question; the never-ceasing intra-action between objects 
and the sense-faculties of a particular organism, and the forced 
and complex communication between these faculties. Deleuze 
describes that, where ‘representation has identity as its 
element and similarity as its unit of measure, then pure 
presence such as it appears in the simulacrum has the 
‘disparate’ as its unit of measure – in other words, always a 
difference of difference as its immediate element’ [5]. 
It is this continual groundless difference that leads Deleuze to 
discuss repetition, or the continuation of the sense-making 
process. However, repetition here is not understood as an 
ending of one sense-making process, thus instigating a new 
one. Rather, repetition is a ‘reprise of pre-individual 
singularities which, in order that it can be grasped as 
repetition, presupposes the dissolution of all prior identities’ 
[5]. Difference and repetition simultaneously signify both the 
beginnings and endings of thought in a process that cannot be 
adequately punctuated by either; ‘everything has its beginning 
in a question, but one cannot say the question itself begins. 
Might the question, along with the imperatives which it 
expresses, have no other origin than repetition’ [5]. Deleuze 
states that attempting to describe repetition through a material, 
representative model is ‘unthinkable’. Repetition is 
‘contemplative and contracting, but non-representing and non-
represented’ [5]. The model of repetition requires the 
installation of ‘sub-representative syntheses… capable of 
contracting the cases or the elements into one another’ [5].  
This contraction is not ‘external to what it contracts’, and the 
difference in repetition is not ‘external to repetition: it is an 
integral part of it, the constituent part, the depth without which 
nothing would repeat on the surface’ [5]. Difference and 
repetition, or sub-representative sense-making, is in 
continuous action; a non-temporal process that cannot be 
adequately described as a succession of instants, in which 
sense and thought initiate and depend on each other. 
As with Harman, Merleau-Ponty and Dewey, no identity, or a 
clear distinction, of or between self and environment, or a 
universal capacity or specific, repeatable process for sense-
making pre-exist within this model of thought. Deleuze 
describes that ‘it is the fortuitousness of the contingency of the 
encounter which guarantees the necessity of that which it 
forces to be thought. There is no amicability…It is a forced 
and broken connection which traverses the fragments of a 
dissolved self as it does the borders of a fractured I’ [5]. It can 
be argued that these ‘broken connections’ that traverse a 
‘dissolved self’ are related to the ‘tangible contours’ as 
discussed by Harman. Objects, sense-making faculties, ‘the 
thousands of passive syntheses of which we are organically 
composed’ [5], and the eventual emergence of self and 
presence all bring each other into being by their intra-action. 
No entity, identified as ‘self’, can be given sovereignty over 
the co-dependent process and other entities that form it. 
Presence is not a phenomenon exclusive to human or non-
human perceptual faculties. Rather, it is the process that 
generates the formation of being itself within specific 
contexts. Objects still intra-act and bring forth each other’s 
being without being scrutinised by sentient entities. The 
‘totality known as world’ [12] still operates, and with it comes 
an infinity of different contexts for being, each generating its 
own evolving presence along the way. 
IV. POST-HUMAN PRESENCE RESEARCH DESIGN 
The philosophical critique of presence above begins to 
articulate a post-human standpoint on presence. The following 
section outlines some suggestions for how post-human 
research design could be approached, addressing the issues 
highlighted with existing research methods. 
A.  ‘Deterritorialisation’ and ‘The Plane of Immanence’ 
Philosophical analyses of presence have indicated an 
abandonment of representation and reflection in favour of an 
exploration into the processes that underlie them. Each 
formation of the instant within representation signifies an 
individual moment of presence for the perceiving subject. 
However, Deleuze argues that ‘those propositions by 
themselves give a completely inaccurate notion of the instance 
which engenders them as cases… By contrast, the idea and 
‘learning’ expresses that extra-propositional or sub-
representative problematic instance’ [5]. The idea of learning 
used to describe the formation of presence is a recurring theme 
within the philosophical works considered; whether in the 
form of habit-forming, sense-experience, or the more global 
evolving emergence of actualisation from a series of 
possibilities. Post-human experiment design may benefit from 
adopting elements of these models in its approach. 
Instead of using VR within presence research in an attempt to 
prove the effectiveness or veracity of a pre-existing theory or 
measure for presence, post-human presence experiment design 
could instead invite participants to explore the open-ended and 
evolving experience of presence as it is uniquely formed for 
them. Participants are encouraged to abandon notions of self 
and environment as they are habitually understood and invited 
to reconsider their understanding, discovering how each 
element is created in intra-action. This process is akin to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of ‘deterritorialization’. Here, 
objects, meanings and understanding itself is continually 
deterritorialized and reterritorialized, on small and large 
scales, for physical, social, cultural, philosophic, scientific, 
historical and a variety of other reasons. ‘For the hominid: 
from its act of birth, it deterritorializes its front paw, wrests it 
from the earth to turn it into a hand, and reterritorializes it on 
branches and tools’ [6]. Encouraging deterritorialization of the 
self and environment into unpredictable forms could 
encourage a wider understanding of the various factors that 
contribute to the formation of these, helping to establish a 
post-human understanding of presence. 
Further to the above, any representative or habitual 
understanding of objects and environments held by researchers 
should, where possible, be eliminated. Nor should VR 
environments be designed in such a way as to attempt to 
represent the experience of other beings. As Deleuze states, ‘It 
is not enough to multiply perspectives in order to establish 
perspectivism. To every perspective or point of view there 
must correspond an autonomous work with its own self-
sufficient sense: what matters is the divergence of series, the 
decentering of circles’ [5]. Post-human presence 
experimentation must work to deliberately diverge from pre-
existing theory, habitual understanding and preconceived 
notions of self, sense, environment and world as fixed entities. 
Unpredictability, relinquishing of control and unexpected 
outcomes are encouraged. The use of VR here provides the 
opportunity to reframe experience in novel ways, inviting 
participants to consider their own sense-making capacities as 
they are put to action, and then to use these insights to 
consider how these are related to and built from all other 
factors within the event. 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the ‘plane of immanence’ 
[6] is where divergence and deterritorialization occurs. 
Deleuze and Guattari describe the plane of immanence as the 
‘absolute ground of philosophy, its earth or 
deterritorialization’ [6]. It is the image of thought ‘that gives 
itself of what it means to think, to make use of thought, to find 
one’s bearings in thought’ [6]. It is not a particular method, ‘a 
state of knowledge on the brain and its functioning [6], a 
collection of concepts, or holds any specific opinions about 
thought. The plane of immanence ‘retains only what thought 
can claim by right… only movement that can be carried into 
infinity’ [6]. This movement ‘takes in everything, and there is 
no place for a subject and an object that can only be concepts’ 
[6]. The plane of immanence is ‘the horizon itself that is in 
movement’ [6]. However, as identified by Harman, this 
horizon is not generated between the thing and its ground, but 
is rather the groundlessness in which all sub-representative 
entities, pre-individual singularities and intra-actional events 
occur. Deleuze and Guattari describe that philosophy is done 
when ‘we head for the horizon, on the plane of immanence, 
and we return with bloodshot eyes, yet they are the eyes of the 
mind’ [6]. It is here also that post-human presence research 
should take place. 
V. CONCLUSION 
A critique of contemporary presence research and a review of 
relevant philosophical perspectives has shown that the concept 
of presence is vastly complex. Existing presence research is 
laden with researcher held pre-suppositions and theories that 
can skew experiment design and the interpretation of results. 
The post-human standpoint on presence articulated here 
addresses these issues, providing the beginnings of a 
framework to approach the concept of presence from a more 
balanced and contingent perspective. This will require 
ongoing and ever-evolving investigation as new contexts and 
modes of being and experiencing are researched. 
The overall standpoint argued here is that presence cannot be 
universally measured or defined. Presence research design, 
taking uncritical approaches to world-hood via representative 
models of reality and perception, excludes much of the 
richness of experience and the intra-dependence of 
contributing factors. The endeavour to understand presence as 
articulated here is motivated by an awareness that a human 
projection of reality is just one of many. This research aims to 
develop an enriched understanding of the intra-dependencies 
that connect collective realities, the deterritorialization of 
human perception as the sovereign mode of understanding, 
and an avoidance of the homogenisation of experience into 
universals, or absolutes. This could aid in developing a further 
understanding, and modes of communication, for and between 
beings engaged in a variety of disciplines; including the social, 
environmental and medical sciences as well as experiential 
design and contemporary philosophy. 
The endeavour to research presence from a post-human 
standpoint will require collaboration from a variety of 
different human and non-human perspectives, in a process 
similar to what Donna Haraway calls ‘sympoiesis’ or 
‘making-with’; quoting Dempster as she describes 
‘collectively producing systems that do not have self-defined 
spatial or temporal boundaries. Information and control are 
distributed among components. The systems are evolutionary 
and have the potential for surprising change’ [7, 11]. Haraway 
explains that ‘ontologically heterogeneous partners become 
who and what they are in relational semiotic-material 
worlding’ [11]. The practice of post-human presence research 
as articulated here consists of experimentation and a 
demonstration of the possibilities of worlding in this way. 
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